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Economic Order Quantity model 
Mechanism design 
a b s t r a c t 
We consider jointly replenishing multiple firms that operate under an EOQ like environment in a de- 
centralized, non-cooperative setting. Each firm’s demand rate and inventory holding cost rate are private 
information. We are interested in finding a mechanism that would determine the joint replenishment fre- 
quency and allocate the joint ordering costs to these firms based on their reported stand-alone replenish- 
ment frequencies (if they were to order independently). We first provide an impossibility result showing 
that there is no direct mechanism that simultaneously achieves efficiency, incentive compatibility, indi- 
vidual rationality and budget-balance. We then propose a general, two-parameter mechanism in which 
one parameter is used to determine the joint replenishment frequency, another is used to allocate the 
order costs based on firms’ reports. We show that efficiency cannot be achieved in this two-parameter 
mechanism unless the parameter governing the cost allocation is zero. When the two parameters are 
same (a single parameter mechanism), we find the equilibrium share levels and corresponding total cost. 
We finally investigate the effect of this parameter on equilibrium behavior. We show that properly ad- 
justing this parameter leads to mechanisms that are better than other mechanisms suggested earlier in 
the literature in terms of fairness and efficiency. 































t  1. Introduction 
The classical Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) model is a well-
known and studied model in inventory management literature. The
core of this model is the trade-off between inventory holding costs
and setup costs associated with production, transportation or pro-
curement. In the simplest form of the model, a firm faces deter-
ministic demand with a constant rate, pays a setup cost for each
replenishment order and incurs inventory holding costs for each
unit of inventory it carries per unit of time. Minimizing setup and
inventory holding costs gives the famous formula for the optimal
order quantity. Since the first study ( Harris, 1913 ), there has been
a vast amount of literature on EOQ model, its extensions and the
more general lot sizing problem. The interested reader is referred
to Jans and Degraeve (2008) for a recent review. 
A major cost saving opportunity in this setting is to consolidate
orders for different items (or locations). By carefully coordinating∗ Corresponding author. Fax: +90 312 266 4054. 
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0377-2217/© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. he replenishment of multiple items that may incur a joint setup,
ne can exploit the economies of scale of ordering jointly and re-
uce setup costs, inventories or both. This problem is known as
oint Replenishment Problem (JRP) and there is a growing litera-
ure in this area since 1960s. See Khouja and Goyal (2008) and
ksoy and Erengüç (1988) for two important reviews of research
n this problem. The basic assumption in this literature is that
he items or locations that are replenished jointly are also con-
rolled centrally. However, this may not be always true. With in-
ense and increasing pressure to reduce costs, independent, and
ometimes competing firms may also be interested in jointly re-
lenishing their inventories. For example, recently, BMW started an
uto-parts purchasing partnership with one of its main competi-
ors, Daimler, to procure more than 10 parts together and looking
or ways to expand this partnership. BMW hoped to generate cost
avings of around 100 million Euros annually through this ven-
ure ( Gilbert, 2010 ). The advent of the Internet and B2B exchanges
ade collaborative purchasing and replenishment easier than ever
nd led to large scale and successful purchasing consortiums or
roups. A recent review article states that collaboration is one of
he most important trends and research opportunities in supply
hain management ( Speranza, 2016 ). 































































































































.1. Related work 
Decentralized joint replenishment has attracted attention in
iterature only recently and studies until now investigate how
he total savings (or total costs) should be allocated among par-
icipants using cooperative game theory. Meca, Timmer, Garcia-
urado, and Borm (2004) propose a coordination scheme where
he players only share their independent order frequencies prior
o joint replenishment. Their allocation mechanism distributes the
otal setup cost among the players in proportion to the square of
heir order frequencies. They show that this allocation is in the
ore of the game. Fiestras-Janeiro, García-Jurado, Meca, and Mos-
uera (2015) study the case where the warehouse space for each
layer is limited, but the inventory holding costs are negligible.
immer, Chessa, and Boucherie (2013) extend the work of Meca
t al. (2004) for stochastic demand and suggest two coordination
trategies. 
When minor setup costs associated with each ordered item are
lso present, it may not be optimal to order every item with ev-
ry replenishment. In fact, the structure of optimal policy is not
nown. For this problem, Hartman and Dror (2007) show that the
ame with a specific group of items has a core, whenever these
tems need to be ordered together on the same schedule to min-
mize total costs. Anily and Haviv (2007) focus on near optimal
ower-of-two policies for this problem, and show the existence
nd example of a core allocation. Zhang (2009) generalizes these
esults for the case of a sub-modular joint setup cost function
nd orders passing through a warehouse that may carry inventory.
inner (2007) uses bargaining models to study the collaboration
etween firms in a similar joint replenishment setting. For a re-
ent review of research that uses cooperative game theory in in-
entory theory, see Fiestras-Janeiro, Garcia-Jurado, Meca, and Mos-
uera (2011) . 
In this paper, we follow a non-cooperative approach for
he joint replenishment problem. Bauso, Giarre, and Presenti
2008) consider a periodic inventory model where each firm needs
o determine the order quantities in each period to satisfy its de-
and. The demand in each period is different but known in ad-
ance. The fixed order cost is shared among multiple firms that
rder in the same period. They show the existence of pure strat-
gy Nash equilibria and propose a consensus protocol that reaches
o one of these equilibria. In Meca, Garcia-Jurado, and Borm (2003) ,
ach firm reports an order frequency (that may be different from
ts true order frequency) and the joint order frequency is deter-
ined to minimize the total joint costs based on these reports.
ach firm incurs holding cost individually and pays a share of the
oint replenishment cost in proportion to the squares of reported
rder frequencies. It is shown that this rule entails significant mis-
eporting and inefficiency. It is shown that the game has multiple
quilibria, in one of which none of the firms participate in joint re-
lenishment. If the firms are sufficiently homogeneous, there also
xists a (unique) “constructive equilibrium”, i.e., an equilibrium in
hich all firms participate in joint replenishment. 
Körpeo ̆glu, Ş en, and Güler (2012) follow a more direct ap-
roach using a two stage game. They assume that there is an in-
ermediary that coordinates the replenishment activity. In Stage 1,
ach firm decides whether to participate in joint replenishment
y agreeing to pay a minimum contribution or to replenish inde-
endently. In Stage 2, each participating firm submits a contribu-
ion to the intermediary. Then, the intermediary determines the
inimum cycle time that can be financed with these contribu-
ions. It is shown that all firms participate in equilibrium and only
hose firms with the highest adjusted demand rates pay more than
he minimum contribution. Körpeo ̆glu, Ş en, and Güler (2013) study
he private information version of the game in Körpeo ̆glu et al.
2012) . It is shown that the privacy of information eliminatesree-riding but contributions are not as high yielding higher
ggregate costs. 
.2. Contributions 
In this paper, we study the mechanism design problem for the
oint replenishment of decentralized firms which have private in-
ormation about their demand rates and inventory holding cost
ates. We first study a direct mechanism where each firm reports
ts independent frequency and a joint replenishment frequency and
he allocation of the joint order costs between the firms are de-
ided based on these reports. We show that a direct mechanism
hich satisfies the efficiency, incentive compatibility and individ-
al rationality constraints cannot satisfy the budget-balance con-
traint, i.e., a truth telling direct mechanism cannot finance the
oint replenishment for efficient cycle times. Next, we generalize
he mechanism suggested by Meca et al. (2003) . While the mech-
nism in Meca et al. (2003) determines the joint order frequency
nd the order cost allocation both based on the squares of the re-
orted stand-alone order frequencies, we use a general formulation
n which two separate parameters govern these decisions. For this
wo-parameter mechanism, we show that the joint frequency is al-
ays lower than the efficient frequency unless the order cost is al-
ocated uniformly. We then study the one-parameter mechanism,
here these two parameters are equal to each other. We find the
onditions necessary for a constructive equilibrium and character-
ze this equilibrium. We also provide necessary conditions for con-
exity at the equilibrium point. We analyze the comparative statics
f the one-parameter model and show that using smaller values of
his single parameter leads to better mechanisms in terms of fair-
ess and efficiency. 
. The model and preliminaries 
We consider a stylized EOQ environment with a set of firms
 = { 1 , ..., n } . Demand rate for firm i is constant and determinis-
ic at β i per unit of time. Inventory holding cost per unit time for
rm i is γ i per unit. We denote the adjusted demand rate of firm
 as αi = γi βi . We assume that adjusted demand rates are strictly
ositive, αi > 0 for all i ∈ N to rule out trivial replenishment envi-
onments where either the demand rate or the holding cost rate is
ero. Major ordering cost is fixed at κ per order regardless of order
ize. Minor ordering costs (ordering costs associated with firms in-
luded in an order) are assumed to be zero. We assume that the
utside supplier that replenishes the orders has infinite capacity.
he firms aim to minimize their long-run average costs over time
nd backorders are not allowed. 
In any setting, the objective is to minimize the total cost rate,
enoted by C , i.e., the sum of replenishment cost rate ( R ) and hold-
ng cost rate ( H ): C = R + H. The decision variable can be taken as
rder cycle time, t , or order frequency, f = 1 /t (number of orders
er time unit). We take frequency as the decision variable in the
equel. 
Vectors are denoted by lower-case letters in bold typeface. For
n endogenous variable X , by X a 
M 
we refer to the value of X when
he set of firms is M and replenishment operations are governed
y a ∈ { c , d , 2 p , 1 p }, where c stands for centralized, d stands
or decentralized (or independent) replenishment, 2 p stands for
wo-parameter mechanism and 1 p stands for the single-parameter
echanism. For instance, C c 
M 
is the total cost of the firms in M
hen replenishment is centralized. When the set M is a singleton,
.g., M = { i } , we use X a 
i 
instead of X a { i } . Exceptions to this notation
re used for f i , the optimal frequency of the decentralized replen-
shment for firm i and for f ∗ , the optimal frequency of centralized
eplenishment. 







































































































t  2.1. Independent (decentralized) replenishment 
When the replenishment of the items is controlled by firms op-
erating independently, the problem is the well-known EOQ model.
Firm i ’s total cost rate ( C i ) is the sum of replenishment cost rate
( R i ) and the holding cost rate ( H i ) can be found: 




It can be easily found that firm i ’s optimal frequency is f i =√ 
αi / 2 κ ( Zipkin, 20 0 0 , Ch. 3). With this frequency, optimal replen-
ishment cost rate and optimal inventory holding cost rate are equal
at R d 
i 
= H d 
i 
= κ f i . The aggregate total cost rate for all firms under
independent replenishment is therefore C d 
N 
= ∑ i ∈ N 2 κ f i . 
2.2. Centralized joint replenishment 
When all firms cooperate, they order with a joint order fre-
quency to achieve the efficiency. Meca et al. (2004) show that
when there are no minor setup costs, it is optimal for all firms
to be replenished in each cycle and this leads to a common order
frequency. Denoting the joint order frequency by f , the total cost
under cooperation is given by 
 N ( f ) = R N ( f ) + H N ( f ) = κ f + 
∑ 
i ∈ N αi 
2 f 
= κ f + κ
∑ 





Using the first order condition, we obtain the efficient frequency
as f ∗ = 
(
f 2 1 + ... + f 2 n 
)1 / 2 
. The efficient total cost is then C c 
N 
= 2 κ f ∗. 
We use the proportional rule of Meca et al. (2004) which sim-
ply allocates the order costs based on the proportion of adjusted
demand rate of firm i to the sum of adjusted demand rates. This
rule is in the core of the cooperative game. With this propor-
tional rule, the cost share of firm i is αi / ( α1 + · · · + αn ) . Since,
f 2 
i 




+ · · · + f 2 n 
)
.








+ · · · + f 2 n 
. 
3. Mechanism design for the joint replenishment problem 
We consider the design of a mechanism for the joint replen-
ishment problem. A mechanism is a specification of how economic
decisions should be taken for a set of players who are privately
informed about their preferences based on the messages they pro-
vide to an intermediary. Mechanism design problem usually con-
sists of three steps. In step 1, the mechanism is designed. In step
2, the players accept or reject the mechanism. If a firm rejects the
mechanism, it gets an exogenously specified reservation utility. In
step 3, the players play the game specified by the mechanism and
economic outcomes and payoffs for each player are determined. A
mechanism is efficient if it maximizes the sum of player’s payoffs.
A truth-telling strategy is a strategy in which the player reports
true information about his preference, regardless of the value of his
preference. A mechanism is incentive compatible if for any player,
truth-telling is a dominant-strategy. A mechanism is individually
rational if for any player the mechanism leads to a payoff that is
at least as much as his reservation utility. A direct mechanism is
a mechanism where each player sends a message regarding his
preference. 
We consider designing a mechanism for the joint replenishment
problem. We assume that each firm’s adjusted demand rate, αi 
for firm i , is observable, but not verifiable. Each firm’s adjusted
demand rate, or consequently, its optimal independent order fre-
quency f i (since f i = 
√ 
αi 
2 κ and κ is common knowledge) can beonsidered as its type . We assume that the types are independent
raws. In addition to the firms in N = { 1 , . . . , n } , we introduce the
layer n + 1 that will be responsible for the replenishment. The
echanism will select an outcome or a joint frequency f as a re-
ult of the players’ reports of their types. Each firm’s utility can be
epresented in the quasi-linear form as follows: 




− p i , (2)
here the first term is the firm i ’s value for alternative f or its in-
entory holding cost rate. The second term is the payment by the
rm to the mechanism. The player n + 1 ’s utility can also be rep-
esented in quasi-linear form: 
 n +1 ( f, p n +1 ) = −κ f − p n +1 , (3)
here the first term is the replenishment costs incurred and the
econd term is the payment of player n + 1 . Each firm’s reservation
tility is equal to its independent optimal cost rate, C d 
i 
= 2 κ f i for
rm i . Player n + 1 ’s reservation utility is zero. 
We consider a direct mechanism, therefore firms report their
ndependent replenishment frequencies. In this case, a mechanism
ill be defined by an outcome rule which specifies the joint re-
lenishment frequency and a payment rule which specifies the pay-
ents by each player as a function of the reported independent
eplenishment frequencies. An efficient mechanism for this prob-
em should select the optimal frequency of the centralized problem




+ · · · + f 2 n 
)1 / 2 
as the joint replenishment frequency lead-
ng to total costs that is equal to the total costs for the centralized
roblem, i.e., 2 κ f ∗ . A common requirement for a mechanism in this
etting is budget-balance . This condition requires that the sum of
ayments from firms in N through the mechanism should finance
he joint setup or ordering cost incurred by player n + 1 . The main
uestion in mechanism design is whether there is a direct mech-
nism for the joint replenishment problem that is efficient, incen-
ive compatible, individually rational and budget-balanced. The an-
wer to this question is unfortunately negative which follows from
yerson and Satterthwaite (1983) who show that the there are no
echanisms that satisfy these four properties simultaneously for
ilateral trading and Williams (1999) which generalizes this result
or multi-firm general settings where the firms have quasi-linear
tilities. 
Given this impossibility result for direct mechanisms, we will
evisit the mechanism suggested by Meca et al. (2003) for com-
etitive environments and explore its generalizations. According to
his mechanism, each firm i reports its optimal independent fre-
uency ˆ si (which can be different from the true optimal indepen-
ent frequency f i ) without knowing the choices of other firms. Let
ˆ = ( ̂ s1 , ̂  s2 , . . . , ̂  sn ) be the vector of reported optimal independent
requencies. If only one firm has chosen a positive ˆ si in this step,
hen all firms order alone and incur their stand-alone optimal cost
ate. Otherwise, all firms that reported a positive independent fre-
uency order jointly. In this case, the joint frequency is selected
s 
√ ∑ 
j∈ N ˆ s2 j (i.e., outcome rule). These firms incur inventory hold-
ng costs based on this joint frequency. The joint setup costs are
llocated to these firms based on the proportional rule that Meca
t al. (2003) suggest for the cooperative setting. Namely, firm i is




j∈ N ˆ s 2 j of the joint replenishment costs. As a result,







ˆ s 2 
j 
+ 
κ ˆ s 2 
i 
√ ∑ 
j∈ N ˆ s
2 
j ∑ 
j∈ N ˆ s
2 
j 
= κ f 
2 
i √ ∑ 




κ ˆ s 2 
i 
√ ∑ 
j∈ N ˆ s
2 
j ∑ 




here the first term is the incurred inventory holding costs and
he second term is the allocation of the joint order costs. Finally,












































































ll firms that reported ˆ si = 0 in the first step order alone. In most
f their analysis, Meca et al. (2003) focus on constructive equilibria
here ˆ si > 0 for all i ∈ N . Since firms with ˆ si = 0 do not partici-
ate in joint replenishment, in the absence of minor setup costs,
ny equilibrium that is not constructive will clearly suffer from in-
fficiency. Meca et al. (2003) show that this mechanism can en-
ail significant misreporting and lead to inefficient joint decisions.
herefore, in the next two sections, we study generalizations of
his mechanism. 
. Two-parameter mechanisms 
In the previous section we showed that there is no truth-telling
irect mechanism that can achieve efficiency, individual rationality
nd budget-balance simultaneously. In this section we consider a
eneral class of mechanisms and investigate their ability to reach
n efficient and fair outcome. We again assume that adjusted de-
and rates, thus independent frequencies are observable by all
rms, but not verifiable. We assume that each firm reports a fre-
uency denoted by ˆ si for firm i and a mechanism determines the
oint order frequency and the allocation of the setup cost based
n these reports. We consider a two-parameter mechanism where
ne parameter ( ξ ) governs the joint order frequency decision and
nother parameter ( θ ) governs the allocation decision. In partic-




+ · · · + ̂  sξn ) 1 /ξ , and replenishment setup cost share of firm i is
ˆ θ
i 
/ ( ̂ sθ
1 
+ · · · + ̂  sθn ) . Since we allocate all of the setup cost using the
arameter ξ , the budget-balance condition is trivially satisfied for
his mechanism. 














) − 1 
ξ
+ 
κ ˆ s θ
i 
(∑ 










he first term on the right hand side of (5) is the average inven-
ory holding cost. The second term is the time averaged order cost
hat is allocated to firm i . Note that the cost of firm i depends on
ts reported frequency as well as its rivals’. Therefore, we have a
on-cooperative game where each firm’s strategy is its reported
requency and we can use Nash equilibrium as a solution concept. 
In order to find the best response correspondence of firm i to
he strategies of other firms, we obtain the first order condition.
enoting the equilibrium strategy vector as s = (s 1 , .., s n ) , the first
rder condition at the equilibrium is given by: 
∂C 2 p 
i 
( ̂ s) 
∂ ̂  si 
∣∣∣∣
ˆ s= s 






) − 1 
ξ
−1 







































= 0 . 
e can simplify this equation by multiplying by




j∈ N s θj ) 
2 ( 
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1 − 1 





































y rearranging the terms, we obtain 




































his implicit function gives the equilibrium reported frequencies
 i , but no further simplification is possible and a closed form so-
ution for the equilibrium is not available. However, we can deter-
ine the performance (with respect to its ability to reach the effi-
ient solution) of the two-parameter mechanism by the following
roposition. 
roposition 1. The ratio of the efficient frequency and the equilib-






i ∈ N f 
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) 1 / 2 (∑ 
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i = j, j  = k 








Since we are interested in only constructive equilibria where s i 
 0 for all i ∈ N , Proposition 1 shows that unless θ = 0 , the ef-
cient joint frequency is always larger than the joint frequency in
he constructive equilibrium (if it exists) which in turn implies that
ooperative solutions would give smaller costs for all firms. This is
ormally given in the following corollary. 
orollary 1. For the two-parameter mechanisms, the joint frequency
n a constructive equilibrium is always less than the efficient fre-
uency unless the order cost allocation parameter θ = 0 , i.e., the order
ost is allocated uniformly. 
However, θ = 0 is only a necessary condition for efficiency.
here is no guarantee that an equilibrium under a uniform cost
llocation exists. Next, we present an example with ξ = 2 where
he equilibrium does not exist in general. 
 special case: (ξ, θ) = (2 , 0) 
We consider a two-parameter mechanism with joint frequency
arameter as (ξ = 2) and sharing parameter as (θ = 0) which cor-
esponds to a uniform sharing (replenishment cost share of firm
 = 1 /n ). This is an important special case since on one hand effi-
iency can be obtained only if θ = 0 as shown in Corollary 1 and
n the other hand ξ = 2 leads to efficient joint replenishment
requency if the firms were to report their true stand-alone
requencies. 







































































ˆ s2 j 
) 1 
2 
+ κ f 2 i 
( ∑ 
j∈ N 
ˆ s2 j 




⎝ ( ∑ 
j∈ N 
ˆ s2 j 
) 1 
2 
+ n f 2 i 
( ∑ 
j∈ N 
ˆ s2 j 
) − 1 2 ⎞ ⎠ . 
First order condition for optimal response is: 
∂C 1 p 
i 
( ̂ s) 
∂ ̂  si 
∣∣∣∣
ˆ s= s 






s 2 j 
) − 1 2 
− n f 2 i 
( ∑ 
j∈ N 
s 2 j 
) − 3 2 ⎞ ⎠ 




s 2 j 
) − 3 2 ( 
s 2 i + 
∑ 
j  = i 
s 2 j − n f 2 i 
) 
= 0 . 
We obtain the best responses as s 2 
i 
= n f 2 
i 
− ∑ j  = i s 2 j and derive the
equilibrium frequency as ∑ 
j∈ N 
s 2 j = n 
∑ 
j∈ N 
f 2 j − (n − 1) 
∑ 
j∈ N 




s 2 j = 
∑ 
j∈ N 











⇒ f ξ = f ∗, 
which is equal to the cooperative joint frequency. However, note
that the best responses are s 2 
i 
= n f 2 
i 
− ∑ j  = i s 2 j which leads to f i =√ ∑ 
j∈ N s 2 j /n . Therefore in order to have an equilibrium, all firms
should have the same stand-alone frequency. Otherwise, there is
no constructive equilibrium and each firm replenishes indepen-
dently. 
Since further analysis of the two-parameter mechanisms is not
tractable, in the next section, we explore one parameter mecha-
nisms in detail. 
5. One-parameter mechanisms 
In this section, we consider a single parameter mechanism
where we set the value of the parameters for determining the
joint order frequency and allocating the ordering costs equal to
each other. This is done primarily due to the fact that the analysis
of two-parameter mechanisms is intractable. The one-parameter
mechanisms admit an easier mathematical and numerical analy-
sis. In addition, the only mechanism in the literature, the mech-
anism suggested in Meca et al. (2003) is a special version of the
one-parameter policy where the single parameter takes on the
value 2. 
When we assume that θ = ξ , the resulting cost function for a










) − 1 
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In this case, Eq. (6) simplifies to 
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) 1 / 2 (∑ 
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ξ (n − 1) 
( ∑ 














 1 + ξ (n − 1) . (9)
Denoting the joint frequency in equilibrium f ξ = ( 
∑ 
i ∈ N s 
ξ
i 






ξ (n − 1) + 1 , (10)
hich shows that the deviation of the equilibrium joint frequency
rom the efficient joint frequency depends only on the parameter
and n . In particular, f ∗ > f ξ for all ξ > 0 and f ∗ / f ξ is an increasing
unction of ξ . This means that the one parameter mechanisms are
ever perfectly efficient in general, but their efficiency improves as
gets smaller. 
In order to further characterize the equilibrium, we first obtain
he best response function for firm i . The expression in (9) can be
ritten as: ∑ 
j∈ N f 
2 
j 
















j∈ N f 
2 
j 









, for i = 1 , . . . , n. (12)
Clearly, there can be equilibria in which a firm reports 0 and
tays out of the joint replenishment. As is stated before and also
n Meca et al. (2003) , when one or more firms stay out of the joint
eplenishment, we are sure that the total costs will be higher than
he optimal centralized costs (since there are only major setup
osts). Therefore and since our focus is efficiency, we are mainly
nterested in constructive equilibria where each firm reports a pos-
tive frequency. 
We can use the best response functions (11) in (8) and re–








j∈ N f 
2 
j 
− ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i 
( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) (ξ − 1) 
( ∑ 
j∈ N f 
2 
j 
(n − 1) ξ + 1 
)ξ/ 2 −1 
. (13)
f ξ > 1, the argument in (13) is positive if and only if ξ
∑ 
j∈ N f 2 j −
((n − 1) ξ + 1) f 2 
i 
> 0 . On the other hand, if ξ < 1, the argument
n (13) is positive if and only if ξ
∑ 
j∈ N f 2 j − ((n − 1) ξ + 1) f 2 i < 0 .
ince these conditions have to be satisfied for all firms, we can
ormalize these conditions in the following proposition. 
roposition 2. The necessary condition for a constructive equilibrium
or the one-parameter mechanism is given by 
max j∈ N f 2 j ∑ 





(n − 1) ξ + 1 , 
f ξ > 1, and 







































































p i min j∈ N f 2 j ∑ 





(n − 1) ξ + 1 , 
f ξ < 1 . 
Proposition 2 shows that the constructive equilibrium can ex-
st only if firms’ stand-alone optimal frequencies are close to each
ther. Note that these conditions are only necessary conditions. In
rder to show that the solution in (13) is in fact the equilibrium,
e need to show that the payoff function is convex. We provide
he conditions for this in the following proposition. 
roposition 3. The cost function is convex at (13) and the solution
n (13) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if ∑ 
j∈ N 
f 2 j − (ξ − 2) ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i ≥ 0 , for all i = 1 , . . . , n. (14) 
A consequence of this result is that for ξ > 3, we do not have
onvexity at the equilibrium point regardless of the frequency dis-
ribution and for ξ ≤ 2 we always have convexity. Therefore, when
≤ 2, we can state the conditions in Proposition 2 also as suffi-
ient conditions for constructive equilibrium. 
We are now ready to express the costs incurred by each firm in
quilibrium under the single parameter joint replenishment mech-
nism. The cost of firm i in equilibrium can be found by using the



























(s ) = κ f 2 i 
( ∑ 
j∈ N f 
2 
j 
(n − 1) ξ + 1 




j∈ N f 
2 
j 
− ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i 
( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) (ξ − 1) 
( ∑ 
j∈ N f 
2 
j 
(n − 1) ξ + 1 
)− 1 2 
. 
aking the terms to ( 
∑ 
j∈ N f 2 j 
(n −1) ξ+1 ) 
− 1 
2 parenthesis and rearranging the








j∈ N f 
2 
j 
+ (ξ − 2) ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i 




j∈ N f 
2 
j 
(n − 1) ξ + 1 
)− 1 2 
. 




(s ) = 
∑ 
j∈ N 





ξn + (ξ − 2) ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) 
ξ − 1 
)( ∑ 
j∈ N f 
2 
j 




nd the cost ratio of firm i is given by 
C 1 p 
i 
(s ) 







j∈ N f 
2 
j 
+ (ξ − 2) ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i 
ξn + (ξ − 2) ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) 
)( ∑ 
j∈ N 
f 2 j 
) −1 
. 
 special case: ξ = 2 
A special case of our one-parameter mechanisms is the mecha-
ism used in Meca et al. (2003) where the parameter is ξ = 2 . We
evisit this mechanism as this is the only mechanism suggested inhe literature and we would like pose this as a benchmark for dif-
erent values of ξ . 
In this case, the necessary and sufficient condition for a con-
tructive equilibrium given in Proposition 2 simplifies to 
f 2 i ≤
2 
2 n − 3 
∑ 
j  = i 
f 2 j , for all i = 1 , 2 , . . . , n, 
s is also shown in Theorem 2 of Meca et al. (2003) . The equilib-
ium joint frequency simplifies to: 
f ξ = 
1 √ 
2 n − 1 f ∗ < f ∗. 
ince f ξ < f ∗ , clearly this mechanism is inefficient and will lead to
otal cost more than the optimal centralized total costs. 








j∈ N f 
2 
j 
( 2(n − 1) + 1 ) 
)( ∑ 
j∈ N f 
2 
j 
2(n − 1) + 1 
)− 1 2 
= 2 κ
( ∑ 
j∈ N f 
2 
j 




hich shows that each firm has the same cost under joint replen-
shment regardless of their stand–alone frequencies or adjusted de-
and rates. This result shows that in addition to being inefficient,
he mechanism in Meca et al. (2003) is also not desirable in terms
f fairness. 
mpact of ξ and comparative statics 
We now investigate how the equilibrium behavior and effi-
iency change as a function of ξ and stand-alone frequencies. For
his purpose we obtain the comparative statics for the game. 




ξ (n − 1) + 1 , and
herefore we know that the efficiency of the one parameter mech-
nism improves as ξ gets smaller. One can also derive an expres-
ion for the difference between reported frequencies of two firms









− f 2 
i 
(ξ − 1) 
( ∑ 
j∈ N f 
2 
j 
(n − 1) ξ + 1 
)ξ/ 2 −1 
, (15) 
hich shows that for ξ > 1, we have s i < s k . Therefore, the firm
ith higher stand–alone frequency reports a lower frequency than
 firm with lower stand-alone frequency. For ξ < 1, the firm with
igher stand-alone frequency reports a higher frequency. A simi-









(ξ − 2)( f 2 
i 
− f 2 
k 
) 
(ξ − 1) 
)( ∑ 
j∈ N f 
2 
j 
(n − 1) ξ + 1 
)− 1 2 
. (16) 






he firm with higher stand-alone frequency has a lower equilib-







. Therefore, from a fairness perspective, mechanisms with
< 1 or ξ > 2 are preferable to those with 1 < ξ < 2. 
It is also important to understand how a firm’s equilibrium fre-
uency report changes as its own true stand-alone frequency or
ts competitor’s stand-alone frequency changes. We can derive the
artial derivative of the equilibrium reported frequency of firm i , s 
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a  with respect to its own stand-alone frequency f i as follows: 
∂s i 
∂ f i 




(ξ 2 − 2 ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) ) ∑ j∈ N f 2 j − (ξ − 2) ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i ) 
ξ
∑ 
j∈ N f 
2 
j 





f 2 j 
) −1 
. (17)
Similarly, the partial derivative with respect to a rival firm k ’s true
frequency is 
∂s i 
∂ f k 





j∈ N f 
2 
j 
− (ξ − 2) ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i 
ξ
∑ 
j∈ N f 
2 
j 
− ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i 
)( ∑ 
j∈ N 




Corresponding changes in equilibrium costs are given by the
following 
∂C 1 p 
i 
∂ f i 
= κ f i 
(
(ξ + 2(ξ − 2) ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) ) ∑ j∈ N f 2 j − (ξ − 2) ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i 





f 2 j 
) − 3 2 
, (19
∂C 1 p 
i 
∂ f k 




j∈ N f 
2 
j 
− (ξ − 2) ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i 
( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) 1 / 2 (ξ − 1) 
)( ∑ 
j∈ N 
f 2 j 
) − 3 2 
.
(20)
One can also consider the effect of an additional firm, firm
n + 1 , entering the joint replenishment, on the reported frequency
of firm i . For brevity, we only consider the difference of the ξ th 










j∈ N f 
2 
j 
+ f 2 n +1 ) − ( nξ + 1 ) f 2 i 
( nξ + 1 ) (ξ − 1) 
(∑ 
j∈ N f 
2 
j 
+ f 2 n +1 
nξ + 1 




j∈ N f 
2 
j 
− ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i 
( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) (ξ − 1) 
( ∑ 
j∈ N f 
2 
j 
(n − 1) ξ + 1 
)ξ/ 2 −1 












j∈ N f 
2 
j 
+ f 2 n +1 ) + (ξ − 2) ( nξ + 1 ) f 2 i 
( nξ + 1 ) 1 / 2 (ξ − 1) 
)( ∑ 
j∈ N 






j∈ N f 
2 
j 
+ (ξ − 2) ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i 
( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) 1 / 2 (ξ − 1) 
)( ∑ 
j∈ N 
f 2 j 
) − 1 2 
. (22
t is interesting to note that the expression in (22) can take pos-
tive or negative values meaning that adding a new firm to the
oint replenishment program does not necessarily decrease an ex-
sting firm’s total costs in a one-parameter mechanism. For ex-
mple, this may happen when the new firm’s standalone fre-
uency is low and ξ is less than 1. In this case, expecting that
he new firm will report a considerable frequency, existing firms
ecrease their reported frequencies resulting in lower joint fre-
uency and higher total costs for all firms. In situations like
hese, it may be useful to reveal some information regarding the
ew entry’s characteristics such that incumbent firms determine
heir reported frequencies accordingly and benefit from the new
ntry. 
umerical examples 
We demonstrate some of the sensitivity results for the one-
arameter mechanisms using numerical examples in this section.
irst, we demonstrate the effect of ξ on equilibrium reported
requencies, joint frequency, individual costs and total costs in a
est problem with three firms with ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) = (0 . 95 , 1 , 1 . 05) in
igs. 1 and 2 as ξ varies between 0 and 3. Note that the efficient
oint frequency for this problem is f ∗ = 1 . 733 . Fig. 1 shows the
quilibrium frequency reports and resulting joint frequency as a
unction of ξ . Notice that we have a region of ξ for which there is
o constructive equilibrium. 
Corresponding costs (as a percentage of total efficient costs) for
ach firm and total costs are shown in Fig. 2 . Since the equilib-
ium joint frequency approaches the efficient joint frequency as ξ
ets smaller, total costs also approaches to the efficient total costs
n this direction. Also notice that left plot of Fig. 2 confirms our
nalytical finding in (16) . In the first region of ξ which contains
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Fig. 2. Equilibrium individual costs and total cost as a percentage of efficient cost as a function of ξ for ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) = (0 . 95 , 1 , 1 . 05) . 
Fig. 3. Reported frequencies as a function of ξ for ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) = (0 . 9 , 1 , 1 . 1) and ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) = (1 , 1 . 05 , 1 . 1) . 






























e  onstructive equilibrium ( ξ < 1), the equilibrium cost of a higher
tand–alone frequency (or higher adjusted demand rate) firm is al-
ays larger than the equilibrium cost of a firm with a lower stand–
lone frequency. This simple sense of “fairness” is not guaranteed
n the second region ( ξ > 1). 
Based on Eqs. (10) , (15) , and (16) , and Figs. 1 and 2 , using
= 2 (as in Meca et al., 2003 ) is not desirable from an efficiency
nd fairness perspective. One needs to have ξ < 1 for fairness. In
ddition, Proposition 2 and Eq. (15) implies that lower values of
should be preferred for efficiency and to ensure a constructive
quilibrium. The only downside of using very small values of ξ
eem to be the fact that the differences between reported frequen-
ies are indistinguishable. 
Figs. 3 –5 show equilibrium reported frequencies, individual firm
osts and total costs, respectively, for two other test problems:( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) = (0 . 9 , 1 , 1 . 1) and ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) = (1 , 1 . 05 , 1 . 1) . The re-
ults are similar to the results for the first problem, except that
he region for which no constructive equilibrium can be obtained
xpands (shrinks) as stand-alone frequencies get closer to (further
way from) each other. 
In Fig. 6 , we compute the comparative statics given in (17) and
18) for the effects of own and rival’s true replenishment fre-
uency on a firm’s reported frequency for the test problem with
( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) = (0 . 95 , 1 , 1 . 05) . Fig. 6 shows that when ξ < 1, the
rm should report higher frequencies as its true frequency in-
reases. This is in contrast to the second region of constructive
quilibrium, where the firm report lower frequency as its true
requency increases. For the same problem, the comparative stat-
cs given in (19) and (20) are shown in Fig. 7 . Fig. 7 shows that
quilibrium cost for a firm is increasing in its own frequency and
10 0 0 K. Güler et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 259 (2017) 992–1002 
Fig. 5. Equilibrium total cost as a percentage of efficient cost as a function of ξ for for ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) = (0 . 9 , 1 , 1 . 1) and ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) = (1 , 1 . 05 , 1 . 1) . 
Fig. 6. Rate of change of firm 1’s equilibrium reports with f 1 and f 2 as a function of ξ for ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) = (0 . 95 , 1 , 1 . 05) . 






















decreasing in its rival’s frequency when ξ < 1 and and the signs
are reversed when ξ > 1. The results in Figs. 6 and 7 confirm
that using ξ < 1 leads to a more desirable mechanism in terms of
fairness. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we consider jointly replenishing multiple, decen-
tralized firms under an EOQ like environment. We assume that the
adjusted demand rates are observable, but not verifiable and there-
fore investigate the use of direct and indirect mechanisms to de-
termine a joint replenishment frequency and allocate setup costs.
First, we show that there is no direct mechanism that is efficient,ncentive compatible, individually rational, and budget-balanced.
ence, we explore specific mechanisms and investigate their abil-
ty to reach efficient and fair outcomes. In particular, we first study
wo-parameter mechanisms in which one parameter governs the
oint frequency decision and the other governs the setup cost allo-
ation. We show that it is not possible to achieve efficiency unless
he setup costs are allocated uniformly. When these two param-
ters are equal, we derive conditions for the constructive equilib-
ium and characterize the equilibrium and comparative statics. We
how that mechanisms with smaller values of this single param-
ter lead to more efficient outcomes and are more defendable in
erms of fairness. 

























s  cknowledgment 
The research supporting the final revision of this paper is un-
ertaken during Kemal Güler’s visit at Bilkent University supported
y a TÜB ̇ITAK BIDEP 2236 Co-Circulation fellowship. He thanks
ÜB ̇ITAK for financial support, colleagues at Bilkent University In-
ustrial Engineering Department for their hospitality, and Bari ̧s
li, Betül, Elfe, and Sertu ̆g for their big hearts and warm Ankara
emories. 
ppendix 
roof of Proposition 1 
Summing (6) over all i ∈ N yields: 
 
i ∈ N 
f 2 i = 
( ∑ 
i ∈ N 
s θi 
) −1 ( ∑ 
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Dividing both sides by ( 
∑ 
i ∈ N s 
ξ
i 
) 2 /ξ leads to the desired result.
roof of Proposition 3 
For the single parameter case the second derivative of the pay-
ff function is as follows: 
∂ 2 C 1 p 
i 
( ̂ s) 
∂ ̂  s2 
i 
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ˆ s= s 






) − 1 
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−1 






) − 1 
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Factoring the expression, we obtain 
∂ 2 C 1 p 
i 
( ̂ s) 
∂ ̂  s2 
i 
∣∣∣∣
ˆ s= s 

























+ (1 + ξ ) s ξ
i 
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− (2 ξ − 1) s ξ
i 
) ⎞ ⎠ . 
For convexity, the argument above should be non-negative. Us-
ng this, we get the following condition: 








−1 ( ∑ 












− (2 ξ − 1) s ξ
i 
) 
≥ f 2 i 
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Using (11) and (13) in the inequality, we get 
(ξ − 1) 
⎛ 
⎝ ( ∑ j∈ N f 2 j 








⎝ ( ∑ j∈ N f 2 j 






j∈ N f 
2 
j 
− ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i 
( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) (ξ − 1) 
( ∑ 
j∈ N f 
2 
j 
(n − 1) ξ + 1 




j∈ N f 
2 
j 
ξ (n − 1) + 1 
) ξ
2 
−(2 ξ − 1) 
ξ
∑ 
j∈ N f 
2 
j 
− ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i 
( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) (ξ − 1) 
( ∑ 
j∈ N f 
2 
j 
(n − 1) ξ + 1 
)ξ/ 2 −1 )
≥ f 2 i 
⎛ 
⎝ (ξ − 1) ( ∑ j∈ N f 2 j 
ξ (n − 1) + 1 
) ξ
2 
− (1 + ξ ) 
ξ
∑ 
j∈ N f 
2 
j 
− ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i 
( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) (ξ − 1) 
( ∑ 
j∈ N f 
2 
j 
(n − 1) ξ + 1 
)ξ/ 2 −1 ) 
.
Simplifying the terms yields 
(ξ − 1) 
(
( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i −
∑ 
j∈ N f 
2 
j 




(2 ξ − 1) ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i − ξ 2 
∑ 
j∈ N f 
2 
j 
( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) (ξ − 1) 
)
≥ f 2 i 
(
(ξ + 1) ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i − (3 ξ − 1) 
∑ 
j∈ N f 
2 
j 
( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) (ξ − 1) 
)
. 
Next, we consider the cases for ξ > 1 and ξ < 1 separately
ince the equilibrium conditions for both cases are different. For






























Z  ξ > 1 the condition is: ( 
( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i −
∑ 
j∈ N 




(2 ξ − 1) ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i − ξ 2 
∑ 
j∈ N 
f 2 j 
) 
≥ f 2 i ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) 
( 
(ξ + 1) ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i − (3 ξ − 1) 
∑ 
j∈ N 
f 2 j 
) 
.
Denote E = ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i and F = 
∑ 
j∈ N f 2 j and the condition
simplifies to: 
( E − F ) 
(
(2 ξ − 1) E − ξ 2 F 
)
≥ E ( (ξ + 1) E − (3 ξ − 1) F ) 
⇒ (2 ξ − 1) E 2 − ξ 2 EF − (2 ξ − 1) EF + ξ 2 F 2 
≥ (ξ + 1) E 2 − (3 ξ − 1) EF 
⇒ (ξ − 2) E 2 − (ξ 2 − ξ ) EF + ξ 2 F 2 ≥ 0 
⇒ (ξF − (ξ − 2) E)(ξF − E) ≥ 0 . 




f 2 j − (ξ − 2) ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i ≥ 0 . 
For ξ < 1, 
( E − F ) 
(
(2 ξ − 1) E − ξ 2 F 
)
≤ E ( (ξ + 1) E − (3 ξ − 1) F ) 
⇒ (2 ξ − 1) E 2 − ξ 2 EF − (2 ξ − 1) EF + ξ 2 F 2 
≤ (ξ + 1) E 2 − (3 ξ − 1) EF 
⇒ (ξ − 2) E 2 − (ξ 2 − ξ ) EF + ξ 2 F 2 ≤ 0 
⇒ (ξF − (ξ − 2) E)(ξF − E) ≤ 0 . 




f 2 j − (ξ − 2) ( (n − 1) ξ + 1 ) f 2 i ≥ 0 , 
which is same as what get for ξ > 1. eferences 
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